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vulgence of the intercepted communication or, "the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or
use the same or any information therein contained for his own benefit or
for the benefit of another not entitled thereto."'1 2 The Supreme Court hav-
ing found that Section 605 was violated said, "evidence obtained by means
forbidden by Section 605 whether by state or federal agents, is inadmis-
sible in a federal court."'18
The Supreme Court in the Benanti case has abolished the "Silver-
Platter Doctrine" in relation to wiretap evidence. This construction of
Section 605 is consistent with the spirit of the Holmes and Brandeis dis-
sent in Olmstead v. United States.14
12 Authority cited note 4 supra.
13 Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 100 (1957).
14 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
DISCOVERY-INSURANCE COVERAGE SUBJECT TO
PRE-TRIAL INTERROGATORIES
Plaintiff, during the pendency of a personal injury action, requested the
defendant to answer discovery interrogatories which would disclose the
name of the defendant's insurer, if any; and if there was one, the policy
limits for each person. The defendant refused to answer and the lower
court ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to receive answers to the inter-
rogatories. The defendant then brought a mandamus proceeding to com-
pel the Circuit Court judge to expunge from the record the orders re-
quiring petitioner to answer. The Illinois Supreme Court denied the writ
and held that discovery interrogatories respecting the existence and
amount of defendant's insurance were relevant to the merits of the matter
in litigation as provided in Section 58 (1) of the Civil Practice Act and the
Supreme Court Rules.' People v. Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d 231, 145 N.E. 2d 588
(1957).
The principal issues raised are: (1) How broad is the scope of discov-
' Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 110, S 58(1). "Discovery, admissions of fact and of genuine-
ness of documents and answers to interrogatories shall be in accordance with rules."
Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 110, S 101.19-4 says, "(1) Discovery Depositions-Upon a dis-
covery deposition, the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged,
relating to the merits of the matter in litigation, whether it relates to the claim or de-
fense of the examining party or of any other party, including the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition and location of any documents or tangible things and the
identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts.... Ill. Rev. Stat.
(1957) c. 110, § 101.19-10 says, ..... (2) Discovery Depositions-Discovery depositions
may be used only: (a) for the purpose of impeaching the testimony of deponent as a
witness in the same manner and to the same extent as any inconsistent statement made
by a witness; or (b) as an admission made by a party or by an officer or agent of a party
in the same manner and to the same extent as any other admission made by that person;
(c) if otherwise admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule ......
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ery?; (2) What kind of inquiries are considered relevant to the cause of
action?
Supreme Court Rules 19-4(1) and (2) define the scope of discovery
depositions and manner of examination; Rules 19-10(2) and (3) define
their use.2 "The discovery deposition is less useful at the trial but it allows
broader inquiry. The scope of examination is more liberal in a discovery
deposition."3
In the Fisher case, the court held:
Discovery interrogatories respecting the existence and amount of defendant's
insurance may be deemed to be "related to the merits of the matter in litigation,"
as provided in Civil Practice Rules 19-11 and 19-4 .... Such a construction is in
accordance with the intention of the framers of the amended Rules to give a
broader scope to the practice of discovery and thereby enable attorneys to better
prepare and evaluate their cases. 4
There is no clear cut trend in the United States as to whether or not
insurance coverage can be discovered, since divergent results have been
reached in recent cases.
The courts denying such discovery appear to base their opinions on
the following arguments: (1) Only those matters admissible in evidence
are subject to discovery; (2) Defendant's insurance coverage does not
apprise plaintiff of any additional rights; (3) Expediency should not
cause the courts to overstep the boundaries of discovery; and (4) Such
discovery would violate the defendant's right of privacy.
Some courts in construing the scope of discovery in a narrow sense
consider only matters admissible in evidence or matters which will lead
to new evidence as discoverable. They hold that other types of matter are
not material to the issue. It was said in Goheen v. Goheen,5 "The interog-
atories [concerning discovery of insurance coverage] propounded are
not material to the issue and are not relevant and competent evidence for
the plaintiffs."6 In holding that discovery could be allowed only in con-
nection with matters admissible in evidence, a South Dakota court 7 held
that production and inspection could not be required under the statute
relating to discovery since the insurance policy did not constitute or con-
tain evidence material to any matter in the section.
A second theory advanced for denying discovery of insurance was by
a Nevada court" which said that it was irrelevant and would not appraise
plaintiff of additional rights.
2 Ibid.
3 llinois Civil Practice Act Symposium, 50 Nw. U. L. Rev. 586, 632 (1955).
4 12 Ill. 2d 231, 239, 145 N.E. 2d 588, 593 (1957).
59 N.J. Misc. 507, 154 At. 393 (1931).
o Ibid., at 508, 393. 7 Bean v. Best, 80 N.W. 2d 565 (S.D., 1957).
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Other courts raise a third theory that expediency in clearing the dockets
and disposing of cases at the earliest possible time should not give way to a
proper judicial determination. The court in Jeppesen v. Swanson9 well
illustrates this point by saying:
Under the guise of liberal construction, we should not emasculate the rules by
permitting something which never was intended or is not within declared objects
for which they were adopted. Neither should expedience or the desire to dispose
of lawsuits without trial, however desirable that may be from the standpoint of
relieving congested calendars, be permitted to cause us to lose sight of the limita-
tions of the discovery rules or the boundaries beyond which we should not go."
In a recent case, the Florida court in Brooks v. Owen" denied discovery
of insurance coverage and followed generally the Jeppesen case. The
court held that settlement between the parties before a judicial proceed-
ing was not a determination. 12
A new argument was advanced in the most recent decision on the sub-
ject." The question of whether such discovery violates the United States
Constitution was raised. 14 It could be argued that it naturally and logically
follows that from the discovery of defendant's insurance coverage, the
plaintiff should be informed of the defendant's other assets or entire
financial status so as to make a proper determination of whether or not to
proceed further with litigation. Under such circumstances a plaintiff
could find out the total financial position of a defendant by merely filing
suit. Since such proceedings are of public record, the defendant's assets
could be known to the world before he has been found guilty. It is be-
lieved that obtaining this information before a judicial determination is
had would be an invasion of the right of privacy."'
The courts which allow discovery of insurance coverage reason that
the framers of the various discovery acts intended that matters subject to
discovery must be broader than those admissible in evidence in order to
apprise a plaintiff of all his rights before the trial.1"
8 State v. Second Judicial District Court, 69 Nev. 196, 245 P. 2d 999 (1952).
9 243 Minn. 547, 68 N.W. 2d 649 (1955).
10 Ibid., at 562, 658. "197 So. 2d 693 (Fla., 1957).
12 The court, at p. 700, quoted the Jeppesen case, saying, "... the word 'determination'
refers to the disposition of.the action in some manner over which the court has con-
trol. That the court does not control a settlement is of course obvious."
18 Gallimore v. Dye, E.D. Ill., Docket No. 3,851 (Jan. 13, 1958).
14 U.S. Const. Amend. 5. "No person shall .. . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation."
16 Trial Briefs, Illinois State Bar Association Section on Civil Practice and Procedure,
Feb., 1958.
1 People v. Fisher, 12 111.2d 231, 145 N.E. 2d 588 (1957).
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Through discovery of insurance coverage the courts believe that it will
appraise the injured party of rights otherwise unknown, give counsel a
realistic appraisal of his adversary and of the case he must prepare for, and
afford a sounder basis for the settlement of disputes. 17
In Superior Insurance Co. v. Superior Court,8 the court held that insur-
ance inures to the benefit of any and every person who might be negli-
gently injured, and therefore, the injured party has a discoverable interest;
and in Maddox v. Grauman,19 the court said, "If the insurance question is
relevant to the subject matter after the plaintiff prevails why is it not rele-
vant while the action pends? We believe it is." '20
Another reason for allowing discovery of insurance coverage is that
counsel for the plaintiff can better prepare his case, appraise its worth, and
determine whether to proceed further with litigation or negotiate a settle-
ment. The court, in People v. Fisher,21 said:
The presence or absence of liability insurance is frequently the controlling
factor in determining the manner in which a case is prepared for trial. That
there will be actual rather than nominal recovery conditions every aspect of
preparation for the trial of these cases,-investigators, doctors, photographers
and even the taking of depositions. 22
Discovery of insurance coverage would make settlement more feasible,
for the parties would be better acquainted with their rights, and conse-
quently help alleviate the problem of crowded court dockets. In the
Fisher case the court affirmed this viewpoint when it said:
Such knowledge ... would also lead to more purposeful discussions of settle-
mient, and thereby effectuate the dispatch of court business. This aspect is most
significant in terms of effective judicial administration in coping with today's
congested dockets which are largely attributable to the increasing volume of
personal injury litigation. 21
ITIbid. Is 37 Cal. 2d 749, 235 P. 2d 833 (1951).
19 205 Ky. 422, 265 S.W. 2d 939 (1954).
20 Ibid., at 426, 942. Accord: Brackett v. Woodall Food Products, 12 F.R.D. 4 (E.D.
Tenn., 1951), which allowed discovery of defendant's insurance policy on the ground
that it might afford plaintiff rights he would not have otherwise and this was enough
to make it relevant to the subject matter. In the Fisher case the court said at 238 Ill. 2d,
593 N.E. 2d, "It is not inconceivable that a plaintiff with serious injuries would settle
a substantial judgment against a defendant of modest means for a fractional sum, simply
because he had no knowledge of any additional rights against the insurer. Thus, to
deprive an injured party from learning of his rights against an insurer would, in effect,
nullify the benevolent purpose of such statutes, and permit insurance companies to avoid
their statutory obligation."
21 12 111. 2d 231, 145 N.E. 2d 588 (1957). 22 Ibid., at 238, 593.
23 People v. Fisher, 12 III. 2d 231, 239, 145 N.E. 2d 588, 593 (1957). The dissenting
judge in Brooks v. Owen, 97 So. 2d 693 (Fla., 1957) reasons along the same line as the
Illinois court that such insurance disclosure would help stop a hide and seek game
between plaintiff and defendant for both would know all the facts in issue, which
knowledge is necessary to settle disputes.
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The argument that allowing discovery of insurance coverage opens the
door for discovering the defendant's entire financial status before judg-
ment, which would invade his right of privacy can be met by answering
that liability insurance policies contain unique characteristics due to statu-
tory regulation. In the Fisher case, the court pointed out that statutory
provisions confer an interest in such a policy on every member of the
public that is negligently injured and that the unique characteristics of a
liability insurance policy distinguish it from other financial resources.
After the Fisher case was decided in May, 1957, a motion for leave to
appear amicus curiae and file a brief in support of the petition for rehear-
ing, for and in behalf of five hundred ninety-two insurance companies,
was requested and granted. However, even after the rehearing in which
the opinion of Brooks v. Owen 24 was called to the attention of the court,
the Illinois Supreme Court held to its original decision. What influence
the contrary case of Gallimnore v. Dye 2 5 will have on the rule of the
Fisher case is undetermined at this time.
24 97 So. 2d 693 (Fla., 1957).
25 E.D. I11., Docket No. 3,851 (Jan. 13, 1958).
LABOR LAW-STRIKE UNLAWFUL WHEN CONTRACT
DISPUTE IS PENDING BEFORE RAILROAD
ADJUSTMENT BOARD
The Norfolk and Portsmouth Belt Line Railroad proposed to change
the established starting and quitting points for five of its train crews. The
carrier based its right to initiate this plan on its interpretation of a clause
in the collective bargaining agreement which stated, "The point of going
on and off duty shall be governed by local conditions." The union main-
tained that this action by the carrier could be effected only with the con-
sent of the union or upon prior negotiation. After threat of strike and
petition by the union to the National Mediation Board, the parties were
referred to the Railroad Adjustment Board. The carrier submitted the dis-
pute to the Adjustment Board but the union again called for a strike. The
carrier petitioned the lower court for an injunction which was refused.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, the
judgment was reversed and a permanent injunction prohibiting the strike
was granted. The court impliedly stated that the carrier had the right to
initiate procedures, and the union could properly bring up complaints in
the established grievance procedure after the carrier has set the proposed
change into operation. Norfolk and Portsnoutb Belt Line R. Co. v.
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmnen, Lodge No. 514, 248 F.2d 34 (C.A.
4th, 1957).
The problem before this court is one of the most debated and oft-
